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The international economic order has undergone far-reaching changes since 2009 in 
response to the global financial crisis and to its consequences in the economic, financial 
and regulatory spheres. This period has seen the re-design of the governance and policies 
of the traditional institutions that arose from the Bretton Woods agreements — namely the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the International Trade 
Organization (ITO) — and the emergence of new institutions, at both the global and regional 
scale, all of them under the stewardship of a reinforced G20, which has taken the reins of 
international economic coordination. 
As a result, the new map of international economic relations has taken shape, characterised 
by the greater weight of the emerging economies (in keeping with their growing importance 
in the global economy), greater institutional complexity (with the proliferation of regional 
arrangements), a greater volume of resources and the development of new instruments and 
strategies. Playing a key role in this new map are the international economic bodies, which 
may be classified in four major blocks in terms of their principal mission in the global 
framework: institutions geared chiefly to maintaining economic and financial stability, i.e. to 
crisis management and crisis prevention (such as the IMF); institutions geared to promoting 
growth and development (development banks); trade agreements (WTO and multilateral 
integration agreements) and surveillance and regulation bodies, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).1
This article addresses the main defining elements of this map of international relations, 
paying particular attention to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), in which we 
include, for the purposes of this article, the first two blocks: institutions geared to 
maintaining stability and those focusing on the development of growth strategies. In the 
second and third sections we review the changes made to both sets of institutions. We 
then look at the new global strategies underpinning the growing coordination and 
interconnectedness of IFIs, in particular the G20 growth strategy and the new sustainable 
development goals (SDGs).
The main change in the group of institutions dedicated to ensuring stability has been the 
development of what is known as the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN). Up to 2009, the 
IMF was the main international financial institution with this function. Since then more 
complex arrangements have been forged, seeing other agents coming into play, mainly the 
regional financing agreements (RFAs) and the bilateral liquidity provision mechanisms (such 
as the swap agreements between central banks or the granting of loans between countries). 
Table 1 shows the main elements of this new framework, highlighting the following: a) the 
development of new institutional governance patterns; b) the increase in the volume of 
resources, and c) the design and implementation of new crisis prevention and crisis 
resolution strategies and instruments. 
Introduction 
New institutional map for 
economic and financial 
stability 
1  This classification is not exclusive, since there are institutions that perform functions characteristic of several 
blocks, such as the Bretton Woods institutions themselves, which also have a supervisory function.
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Institutions and international agreements
IMF
Institutions and regional and bilateral agreements
Asia
BRICS
Middle East
Latin America
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). The Initiative was multilateralised in 2010, and the 
related amount rose from $80 billion to $120 billion (in 2010) and $240 billion (in 2012). It also 
introduces precautionary instruments, and the crisis-resolution programmes are coordinated with an 
IMF programme. 
Contingency Reserves Agreement (CRA), 2014. This is a pool of reserves of the central banks of 
the countries identified as BRICS, with capital of $100 billion and China as the majority shareholder 
(40% of the voting power). It can grant precautionary and contingent loans instrumented via swaps, 
with the first tranche of 30% of the country's maximum financing not tied to an IMF programme.
Arab Monetary Fund (AMF). Authorised capital is doubled (to $1.2 billion) and increase in loanable 
amounts (up 300% to $689 million in annual average terms over the 2009-2014 period from $231 
million on average from 1978 to 2008). A new precautionary credit line without conditionality is also 
created for countries with sound fundamentals. 
Latin American Reserves Fund (LARF). $2.3 billion increase in capital to $3.6 billion in 2013, and a 
new member (Paraguay).
Bilateral initiatives
Swap lines. Currency swap lines between central banks increased twenty-fold between 2008 and 
2014 (to $2.5 billion) and the number of agreements almost doubled, with the regional scope of 
agreements expanding. 
Bilateral loans. There have been various bilateral financing agreements in general between countries 
with a high risk of contagion, or for geostrategic reasons. For example: euro area to Greece and 
Ireland; United States to Ukraine; Saudi Arabia to Egypt. They are usually linked to the financial 
support of the IMF or of a regional instrument. 
Improved governance and legitimacy with re-balancing of voting power and realignment of the Board 
in favour of emerging economies. Permanent resources are increased threefold, the crisis resolution 
lending policy is made more flexible (more realistic conditionality and greater access to resources), 
and new precautionary instruments are created. New forms of working in coordination with third 
parties (troika in Europe). Historical increase in the volume of lending, with an annual average of SDR 
74 billion (compared with 13 billion in 1990-2008) and an annual maximum of over 140 billion in 
2011 (the annual maximum in prior years did not reach 40 billion).
Paris Club. Opening up to countries not belonging to the Club (access to meetings, negotiations, 
working groups, ad hoc participation), e.g. participation of China, South Korea, South Africa and 
Brazil. Greater transparency and growing coordination with private creditors, mainly the IIF (Institute 
of International Finance). Launch of the "Paris Forum" (2013), with annual creditor-debtor dialogue, 
along with the G20.Group of creditors
Institute of International Finance (IIF). Growth and diversification of members and private institutions 
from emerging countries (rising from 230 in 2008 to 500 in 2015, in 70 countries). New principles 
accepted on clauses linked to the restructuring of the ICMA (International Capital Market 
Association).
EU
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 2012. Inter-governmental mechanism of the euro area 
countries, with a lending capacity of €500 billion. The loans are subject to conditionality and are 
usually combined with IMF aid. It has a broad range of instruments, including bail-out loans, 
precautionary credit lines, government debt purchases and direct bank recapitalisation. The ESM 
replaces temporary mechanisms that had been activated as from 2010 - Greek loan, European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).  
"BoP Assistance". This is a conditionality-based credit line intended for non-euro area EU members. 
Its resources have been increased from €12 billion to €50 billion. After having been inactive from 
2002 to 2007, it was activated from 2008 for Hungary, Lativa and Romania, with assistance granted 
in combination with other agencies (IMF, WB, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), and on a bilateral basis). 
SOURCES: Institutional reports and own data.
NOTE: New institutions in bold.
MAIN CHANGES SINCE 2009 IN THE INSTITUTIONAL MAP OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
STABILISATION
TABLE 1
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The changes in governance have been two-pronged: the reform of the IMF’s decision-
making structures, and the setting up of new regional institutions, which have also 
supported the IMF’s stabilisation function. 
As regards the change of governance of the IMF, there has been a series of reforms since 
2006 aimed at amending the distribution of the institution’s quotas and the composition of 
its Executive Board, in order to increase the voice and representation of the emerging 
economies. The process of reform has been slow, with stops and starts and lengthy 
extensions, owing to the complex balance of powers within the institution and to historical 
inertia. In short, the highlights2 have included: increases in quotas favouring emerging and 
under-represented countries; the introduction of a new formula increasing the theoretical 
quota of the emerging economies; the realignment of the Board (which is part of the 2010 
reform, ratified by the United States in December 2015)3; a substantial extension of the 
IMF’s multilateral borrowing arrangement (the so-called NAB); the election of an additional, 
Chinese deputy managing director, and the inclusion of the renminbi in the basket of 
special drawing rights (SDRs, the IMF’s currency). 
These changes are largely in response to the need to reflect the greater relative weight of 
the emerging economies in the global economy. As Chart 1 shows, there has been a 
salient rise in the countries identified as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), which will account for more than 33% of global GDP in 2020, according to the IMF, 
with China foremost. Accordingly, the governance reforms will strengthen the legitimacy of 
the IMF, an institution in which countries’ representation should reflect their economic 
weight. The new balance appears to be stable, although certain issues remain outstanding 
in relation to the design of the formula and to the advisability of establishing some type of 
mechanism to ensure convergence between the effective quota (that the country actually 
has) and the calculated quota (that which corresponds to it according to the formula). 
China is the chief example of this discrepancy, since following the implementation of the 
2010 reform it will have an effective quota of 6.4% (ranked third after the United States and 
Japan), far removed from its calculated quota (11.3%). 
NEW GOVERNANCE FOR 
STABILISATION 
2  Developed in Moreno (2012).
3  The US quota affords it veto power, whereby the 2010 reform could not be approved without US ratification. 
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With regard to the growing importance of the role played by regional institutions, this 
stems both from the greater allocation of resources to those already existing and to the 
creation of new institutions. Of note here is the development of a new institutional 
architecture in the euro area (EA), the extension of the Chiang Mai initiative in Asia and the 
creation of the Contingency Reserves Arrangement (CRA) by the BRICS. In other regions 
the resources of the stabilisation institutions have also increased, albeit to a less significant 
extent (see Table 1). 
Europe has developed an extensive financial support toolbox for its member countries, 
especially in the EA. The process has been a staggered one, with the keynote being the 
creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which commenced operating in 
October 20124 and has a lending capacity of €500 billion. Asia notably saw the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM, created in 2000 and multilateralised in 2010) and, in the 
case of the BRICS, there was the CRA. Both arrangements are structured as a pool of 
reserves available to their members and, in both, China plays a central role, contributing 
the largest amount of resources. In a similar fashion to the ESM, CMIM and CRA loans are 
arranged in conjunction with an IMF programme (except for a first tranche of up to 30% of 
the maximum amount to which a country may have access). 
Internationally, mention may also be made of the initiatives of public and private bilateral 
creditors in respect of debt rescheduling or restructuring, including the opening up of the 
Paris Club to non-member countries, a matter of particular significance in the case of 
China, which has become one of the main global creditor countries. 
All these initiatives mark a qualitative change in governance for the stabilisation of 
countries in crisis. It is a matter of combining complementary sources of financing and of 
new means of action, with greater weight on the part of regional institutions in bail-out 
design and financing. In this respect, a new challenge is posed in terms of coordinating 
these institutions, the aim being to optimise resources and the complementarity of the 
different institutions.5
The new institutional arrangements are particularly evident in the distribution of the 
resources for stabilisation. Chart 2 shows the changes in the overall resources available for 
crisis-coverage since 2000. There are two key features: the boosting of the IMF’s resources 
(increased fourfold and with the structure changed, including up to 30% of temporary 
bilateral loans6), and the growth of funding sources complementary to the IMF, including 
the accumulation of reserves, the volume of swap facilities and the development of RFAs. 
Of note in terms of their amount is the substantial growth of reserves as a means of self-
insurance for the country, in the event of a balance of payments crisis, although their 
distribution is very uneven (with the notable weight of China, which accumulates more 
than 30% of global reserves). Since 2000, reserves have increased fourfold and totalled 
close to $12 trillion in 2015, far above the combined resources of the IMF and RFAs ($2.7 
trillion). Mention may also be made here of the swap arrangements between central banks, 
generally linked to liquidity provision in currencies to the banking sector aimed at 
MORE RESOURCES MORE 
WIDELY DISTRIBUTED AMONG 
INSTITUTIONS 
4  The ESM replaces the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), which had been set up in 2010 as a transitory 
instrument in the context of the financing of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The EFSF is not allowed to grant new 
aid since July 2013, but it will remain active until the cancellation of its outstanding loans. Since 2010, the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) has been in place in the EU. 
5  See Garrido et al. (2012).
6  For an analysis of the increase in resources at the IMF, see L’Hotellerie-Fallois and Moreno (2014).
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safeguarding financial stability. Since 2008, the framework of facilities has increased 
considerably in number and size, to almost 100 arrangements, for a value of $2.5 trillion. 
Regionalisation is also observed in the increased size of RFAs, whose aggregate scale has 
exceeded the IMF’s permanent resources since 2010. Overall, IMF and RFA resources 
account in 2015 for almost 2.3% of global GDP, above the figure of 1% they represented 
in 2000. It should be stressed that the regional arrangements are only available for the 
countries making up and belonging to such regions, and also included here is the 
agreement reached by the BRICS countries, which has given a new multinational dimension 
to cooperative agreements. Notable among the RFAs in terms of volume are the European 
initiatives, which account for almost 69% of the total, while the Asian CMIM and the BRICS 
CRA represent 18% and 7.5%, respectively. 
The reforms have also been substantive in terms of crisis resolution and, in particular, 
crisis prevention policies. By way of summary, resolution has been made more flexible and 
prevention has been strengthened in three ways: creating new financial facilities for 
prevention, and deepening regulation and supervision. 
Resolution strategies have adapted to the greater scale and diversity of financial crises 
through the design of bigger, frontloaded programmes that allow for more flexible economic 
policy management to restore confidence vis-à-vis the markets. The IMF has led these 
changes in its own programmes and in those coordinated with the RFAs. The IMF’s 
programmes have thus increased significantly in size. On average, those approved since 
2008 account for 5.9% of the GDP of the country bailed out, compared with 1.8% of those 
prior to that year; and their average amount climbed from $2 billion in 2000-2007 to $5.2 
billion in 2008-2015 ($10.3 billion if the precautionary programmes are considered). That is 
to say, the IMF’s programmes have increased on average by 254% as a percentage of 
GDP and by 156% in size, comparing the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
In 2009 the IMF simplified the conditionality of its programmes, basing it more on an 
assessment of the programme’s general progress than on strict fulfilment of specific 
NEW CRISIS RESOLUTION AND 
CRISIS PREVENTION POLICIES
SIZE OF THE LAYERS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NET CHART 2
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SOURCES: IMF, Annual reports, RFA websites and CRA Treaty.
NOTES: The 2015 reserves figures correspond to end-2014. The exchange rates in 2000-2010 and the first figure of the year for 2015 have been taken.
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conditions. Moreover, the programmes should be clearly “owned” by the country’s 
economic authorities.7
Noteworthy in respect of prevention is the creation of the new precautionary credit lines, also 
led by the IMF and which have been incorporated into several RFAs (e.g. ESM, CMIM, CRA 
and the Arab Monetary Fund). The Fund has introduced the so-called FCLs (Flexible Credit 
Lines) and PLLs (Precautionary Liquidity Lines), which are preventive lending instruments 
whose aim is to provide a financing buffer for those members with sound fundamentals and 
a track record of healthy policies subject to international contagion risk. This is an innovative 
type of instrument, as the country may have access to it if it complies with ex ante qualifying 
requirements. They are a sort of seal of approval by the IMF for good behaviour, backed by 
resources if the country needs them. With the exception of Macedonia, countries subscribing 
to these lines have so far not resorted to the funds placed at their disposal.8
In the regulatory sphere, the IFIs have a less prominent role than other institutions such as 
the FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision or, in Europe, the European 
Banking Authority, where these reforms are coordinated. In the case of the IMF, a new 
standard on capital movements is being drawn up in which — unlike the position 
traditionally held by the IMF — the possibility of introducing restrictions on movements in 
situations of balance of payments or credit market difficulties is assumed [IMF (2012)]. 
Reinforced surveillance is the third pillar underpinning the new prevention policy. The IMF 
and the WB have strengthened the joint FSAPs (Financial Sector Assessment Programs), 
which periodically assess the member countries’ financial systems. The IMF has, moreover, 
developed new analytical instruments, such as risk matrices, the systematic analysis of 
the investment positions of a country’s different economic sectors (balance sheet analysis) 
and the mapping of cross-country economic and financial interconnections. In this respect, 
there has been a shift from country analysis towards a more all-encompassing approach 
linking the three surveillance layers (bilateral, regional and multilateral) with growing 
attention to the interconnectedness of the different economic policies and their transmission 
between countries (spillover effects).
7  Moreno (2013), Chapter 5, expands on the reforms to the Fund’s lending policy.
8  See Sánchez and Serra (2015).
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Surveillance has also been bolstered in the regional IFIs. In Europe, the ESM participates 
in the monitoring of countries with a programme and, in the case of the CMIM, AMRO 
(ASEAN + 3 Macroeconomic Research Office) has been set up to monitor economies and 
the risks to which the member countries are subject.
The IFIs devoted to growth and development have also shaped a new institutional map 
since 2009 (see Table 2), in which three key elements stand out: a) a new governance 
framework; b) the increase in resources available and in the volume of lending, and c) the 
change in development strategies (addressed in the following section).
The changes in governance have also been structured around, on one hand, the reform of 
governance at the WB (and at other traditional development banks), but especially, on the 
other, the emergence of new institutions devoted to development. The reform of the WB 
entails a 4.6% transfer of votes to the emerging and developing economies (making for 
47.2% of the total) and an additional Executive Director for a sub-Saharan country [World 
Bank (2015)]. At the other development banks existing prior to 2009, there has also been 
a series of governance reforms aimed at increasing the weight of the emerging economies 
[e.g. China joined the Inter-American Development Bank in 2009 and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 2016].
However, the main change has come about as a result of the creation of new regional institutions, 
including banks such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New 
Development Bank (NDB), which was instituted with particular speed (see Box 1). Such speed 
was in part due to the high borrowing needs of the emerging and developing economies. For 
instance, the Asian Development Bank has estimated that infrastructure requirements in Asia 
will amount to $730 billion per annum up to 2020 [Asian Development Bank (2009)]. But this 
also reveals some distance by the emerging economies from the governance of the traditional 
institutions and their interest in leading new projects with greater sway in decision-making. The 
emergence of these institutions is shaping a new architecture with a shift that means the centre 
of decision-making is no longer only in Washington, which hosts the IMF and the WB. As in the 
stability institutions, coordination between these bodies poses a new key challenge. 
Since 2009, driven by the G20, IFIs geared to development have been increasing their 
resources, including significant capital increases, as shown in Chart 4. Following these 
increases and the creation of new banks (AIIB, NDB), at present the size of the WB 
accounts for 20% of the total capital of these institutions, compared with 40% in 2000. 
Among the regional banks, the European ones (European Investment Bank and EBRD, 
accounting for 23% of total capitalisation) are to the fore, along with the new initiatives of 
the BRICS (AIIB and NDB, 15 %).
The increase in the capitalisation of the development banks, combined with new leveraging 
formulas for their resources, has allowed for a significant increase in lending volumes. 
Annual average loans granted by the main development banks during the 2009-2014 
period increased by more than 125% relative to the 2000-2008 period, climbing from $37 
billion per annum to close to $84 billion in annual average terms.9
The adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (hereafter Addis Ababa) in July 2015 
[UNO (2015a)] marked a turning point in development financing. Addis Ababa sets out a 
New institutional map for 
growth and development 
NEW GOVERNANCE FOR 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
MORE RESOURCES FOR 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
9  With a particularly notable increase in the case of the African Development Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation of the WB Group and the EBRD.
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Institutions and international initiatives
WB Group
Regional institutions and initiatives
BRICS
Africa
African Development Bank (AfDB). It tripled its share capital in 2010 (to $100 billion). It has increased its lending levels, relative 
to the average for the pre-crisis years, by 300% to almost $7 billion per annum on average. 
Middle East +
Islamic Development Bank (IDB). It increased its capital exponentially to SDR100 billion in 2013, from SDR6 billion in 2000. 
Loans over the 2005-2015 period were more than double those over the previous 30 years. 
Deauville Partnership International (2011), G8 initiative to coordinate donor and development bank efforts to transition Arab 
countries through a Transition Fund for these countries, with the World Bank as trustee.
Asia
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 200% capital increase to $165 billion, with no change in the relative weight of its members. 
Boost to lending capacity to $20 billion per annum (50% increase)  to 2017 through: i) public-private cooperation for 
investment in infrastructure; ii) new lending facilities; iii) co-financing with AIIB. Goals: inclusive and sustainable growth,
respecting the environment, and regional integration.
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 2014. Endowment capital of $100 billion, mostly regional (75%), with China as 
the main partner (30% of the capital). Headquartered in Beijing, and intended for infrastructure projects in the region on a 
cooperative basis (see Box 1).
New Development Bank (NDB), 2014. Endowment capital of $100 billion (half subscribed by the BRICS, in equal 
proportions), earmarked to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects (public and private alike) by means of 
loans, guarantees and participation in investments (see Box 1). 
Latin America
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Group. Increase in share capital by almost 70 % — to $171 billion — and inclusion of 
China. Pre-crisis lending levels increased by approximately 6% (relative to 2010) to around $13.5 billion per annum in 2014.   
Andean Development Corporation (ADC), Development Bank. 50% increase in capital to $15 billion (2015). It is the main 
source of financing of infrastructure and energy for Latin America, and since 2004 it has grown most significantly, almost 
attaining the WB and the IDB in terms of volume of financing for the region (loans increased by 10% relative to 2010, up to 
$12 billion per annum in 2014). Unlike the development banks, a high proportion of the ADC's shareholders are from the 
private sector.   
In governance, reform of quotas and of the Board in favour of the emerging and developing economies (including an additional 
Executive Director for the African countries). Institutional reorganisation giving priority to global practices. Increase in capital 
from IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and IFC (International Finance Corporation) windows and 
in concessional loans from the IDA (International Development Association), reaching an all-time peak of $52 billion for the 
2014-2016 period. The annual volume of loans is raised by 30% — to $25 billion —  and the margin for manoeuvre (maturities 
and rates) is made more flexible.
Global initiatives on infrastructure
The WB initiated the Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF) in 2014. It is a platform for combining infrastructure financing efforts 
in emerging and developing countries, pooling resources from the various development banks and from the private sector 
through public-private partnerships (PPP).
The G20 set up the Global Infrastructure Hub (GIH) in 2014 in Sydney to coordinate information, initiatives, good  
practices and investment plans in a multi-year (four-year) agenda. 
Europe
European Investment Bank (EIB). €10 billion increase in capital (2013) to €243 billion, making it the leading regional 
development bank in terms of capitalisation. The volume of annual loans almost doubled, from €45 billion (2000) to €77 billion 
(2014). Capital from the European Investment Fund (EIF) window also increased to €4.5 billion, routed through loans, capital 
and guarantees, instead of subsidies. The EIB also contributes to the Investment Plan for Europe (Juncker Plan, 2014). 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). It has broadened its scope to Central Asia and the Arab 
countries. China joined as a member in 2016.
SOURCE: Institutional reports and own data.
NOTE: New institutions in bold.
MAIN CHANGES SINCE 2009 IN THE INSTITUTIONAL MAP OF DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH TABLE 2
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comprehensive financing strategy to attain SDGs, which are to guide development banks’ 
strategies over the 2015-2030 period. It encompasses numerous political commitments 
and specific measures that envisage not only financing sources — a challenge considered 
in terms of moving from “billions to trillions” [IMF-World Bank (2015)]— but also aspects 
such as international cooperation on tax, finance, trade, science, technology, innovation 
and capacity-building, inter alia. 
The most significant Addis Ababa financing element is the emphasis on national resources and 
on private-sector participation. In the mobilisation of national resources, it undertakes to 
improve the management of public revenue in developing countries by means of modernised 
and progressive tax systems, more efficient tax collection, and the combating of tax evasion 
and the reduction in illegal financial flows by 2030. The policies on international taxation 
pursued by the G20 and the OECD in recent years are fundamental here. The debt burden of 
the developing countries is also addressed. The burden declined by 75% from 2000 to 2013 
as a result, among other factors, of the debt relief launched from the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the G8, a bigger expansion in trade and the lower cost of credit in recent years. 
As regards private-sector involvement, Addis Ababa underscores the importance of 
tailoring incentives to attract private investment to public development policy targets and 
to regulatory frameworks. Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays a key role in the financing 
of developing economies. Despite the improved investment climate, FDI is not always 
targeted on these countries, especially the least developed economies, owing to the lack 
of technology and infrastructure; accordingly, it is wished to boost this type of project as 
part of an overall investment strategy.
Economic policy coordination at the global level is guided by two main strategies, without 
prejudice to each country and each region marking their own priorities: the Strategy for 
Growth, approved at the Brisbane G20 summit (November 2014), and the 2030 Agenda 
(SDGs), approved by the UNO (September 2015). These major challenges mark the 
medium- and long-term strategies for action by IFIs. 
Strategies: growth  
and sustainability
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 AfDB (AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK)  NDB (NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK)
 RATIO (TOTAL IFIs / GLOBAL GDP) (right-hand scale)
TOTAL SIZE AND IN RELATION TO GLOBAL GDP
%$bn
SOURCES: Annual reports and websites.
NOTE: Capital allows for an approximation to lending capacity, although each institution has its own financing and leverage arrangements. The most striking 
example is in Latin America, where the IADB and the CAF have a very similar volume of loans, but whose capitalisation is tenfold that of the IADB.
a Includes EIB subscribed capital, authorised for the rest.
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Following the Great Recession in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis, the 
G20 has spearheaded the strategy for the economic growth and recovery of the advanced 
and emerging economies through the so-called Framework for Growth, which is geared to 
setting strong, sustainable and balanced growth in place. Its implementation is based on 
a mutual assessment process by the G20 members, supported by the technical analysis 
provided by the IMF and other IFIs.10 The latter have contributed actively with theoretical 
and empirical input on the impact and implementation of the macroeconomic policies and 
the structural reforms proposed.11
In the initial years, the strategy was marked by the need to emerge from the crisis; but from 
2014, when it was noted that the recovery in activity in the advanced economies was not 
accompanied by sufficient and high-quality employment generation, the emphasis shifted 
towards structural reforms and sustainability. The Brisbane G20 summit in November 2014 
adopted the “2 in 5” collective commitment aimed at achieving by 2018 a cumulative 
increase in the GDP of the G20 countries 2% above that initially projected by the IMF in 
autumn 2013.12 The plan involves the member countries implementing around 1,000 
specific measures and reforms — individually or in concert13 — relating, inter alia, to the 
product market, the labour market, improved tax efficiency and an annual increase in 
spending on R&D and infrastructure [G-20 (2015)]. These plans are more specific than in 
the past, which will make for better monitoring and peer pressure regarding their fulfilment 
which, in any event, will continue to rest on national responsibility and resolve. 
The IMF, the WB and the OECD are contributing to this process by providing an analytical 
framework for the type of reforms needed, harnessing their comparative advantage, which 
enables them to identify best international practices, adapted to the circumstances of 
each country [IMF-OECD-World Bank (2014)]. In particular, the IMF has established as one 
of its strategic priorities the strengthening of its capacity for analysis and for surveillance 
of countries’ structural policies. 
Another means by which IFIs contribute to the growth strategy is through their support for 
infrastructure policies. Of importance in this connection is the Sydney-based Global 
Infrastructure Hub, created to signal existing shortcomings, improve information exchange 
among different institutions, identify investment and cooperation opportunities, promote 
financing through public-private partnerships and ensure the sustainability of the projects 
at the economic, social and environmental level. Furthermore, the WB launched its Global 
Infrastructure Facility (GIF) in 2014 in order to raise and coordinate private resources and 
resources from other multilateral banks to finance infrastructure in developing countries. 
Notable among regional actions was the Investment Plan for Europe (“Juncker Plan”).14
In the assessment of the strategies presented at the Antalya G20 summit [IMF-OECD 
(2015)], the diagnosis indicates that the measures adopted improve the growth path by 
0.8% of global GDP for 2018, far off the target of 2% (see Chart 5). Two main reasons are 
G20 Growth Strategy 
10  See Estrada (2012) for an analysis of mutual assessment within the G20. 
11  Hernando and del Río (2015) set out the debates surrounding economic policies in the advanced economies.
12  “2” per cent extra growth “in 5” years from 2013 to 2018. The growth estimates to 2018 are taken from the IMF’s 
October 2013 World Economic Outlook (WEO).
13  For instance, the reform of the EA’s architecture or the tax base erosion and profit shifting Action Plan led by the 
OECD.
14  The Plan intends to mobilise €315 billion for new private and public investments from 2015 to 2017, and has led 
to the setting up of institutions such as the European Strategic Investment Fund (ESIF, endowed with €21 
billion), the European Investment Advisory Hub and the European Investment Project Portal. 
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highlighted: the slow implementation of commitments, especially by certain large 
economies (it is estimated that 49% of the measures committed to in Brisbane have been 
implemented), and the low impact on growth of the measures adopted. It would be 
necessary to speed up the timetables established and to add further measures in 2016 to 
be able to attain the target. 
On 29 September, the United Nations approved the SDGs or 2030 Agenda15, which mark 
the strategy for development over the next fifteen years, replacing the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) formulated in 2000 (see Box 2). The 2030 Agenda defines a 
strategy based on three pillars: a financial pillar, determined by Addis Ababa; an 
environmental pillar, decided in December at the Paris Conference on the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change; and global goals marked by the SDGs 
themselves. 
The link between these pillars is an innovation in relation to the MDG strategies. In the case 
of climate change, this entails the necessary participation of the emerging and developing 
economies in the pursuit of environmental goals, set against the traditional argument of 
according them extensive flexibility owing to their relative under-development. In exchange, 
the advanced economies have to finance the process and, in this respect, Addis Ababa 
includes a call for the joint mobilisation of $100 billion per annum to 2020, channeled 
through a Green Climate Fund (GCF) and other instruments, to tackle the needs of 
developing countries. 
The Paris Agreement lays down a binding and definitive commitment to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions from 2020 with five-year reviews. The ultimate aim is to contain the average 
global temperature rise at below 2ºC (ideally 1.5ºC). Policies include the limitation of 
emissions, the design of tax policies and of financial instruments routing investment 
towards green energy, and financial structures to manage climate change-related disasters. 
Here, funding through the IFIs should play a central role. 
The SDGs mark a substantial change in focus from the MDGs on three major fronts. The 
first is the universality of the goals: unlike the Millennium Declaration, the 2030 Agenda is 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS
15  Formally, “Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” [United Nations (2015b)].
ANNUAL IMPACT OF MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BY THE G20 ON COLLECTIVE GDP CHART 5
SOURCE: IMF-OECD (2015).
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applicable to all countries and not only to developing ones, which means moving from a 
unidirectional agenda to one in which the agreed goals and measures are applicable to the 
193 signatory countries.
Second, the scope is extended: while the MDGs focused on inclusion and poverty 
reduction, the SDGs include goals to ensure the sustainability of medium- and long-term 
growth. Specifically, the SDGs comprise 169 targets grouped in 17 goals, in turn in 4 major 
areas: inclusion and poverty, economy, environment and institutional framework (see Table 3). 
The SDGs thus incorporate one of the growth characteristics that the G20 seeks to boost: 
economic and social sustainability, as a necessary condition for development.
Third, the design of strategies is an individual responsibility, but action should be taken 
joining forces with other countries. The starting point for the SDGs is an absence of “one-
size-fits-all” formulas, meaning that each country designs and implements its own strategy 
on the basis of its own policies and national priorities. That said, the means to achieve 
these goals should be based on the sum of the efforts by the different agents involved, 
namely national policymakers, IFIs, donors and the private sector. Here, the chief novelty 
is the integration of the private sector into the process, especially through the promotion 
of joint projects with the public sector.
Since 2009 we have witnessed a proliferation of institutional initiatives and strategic intentions 
in respect of the international economic order. Initially, many of these initiatives arose to resolve 
the consequences of the crisis; the latest ones are more geared to future growth and 
development. These initiatives have shaped a new field of action for IFIs, manifest in the 
changes in their governance, in the increase in their resources and in the reform of their policies. 
Final remarks
slaoGaerA
Inclusion 
and poverty
1  End poverty in all its forms everywhere
2  End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture 
3  Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
4  Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all  
5  Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
6  Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
7  Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
Institutions
16  Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, 
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels 
17  Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development 
Economy
8  Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
9  Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation 
10  Reduce inequality within and among countries
Environment
11  Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable 
12  Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns 
13  Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
14  Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
15  Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt 
and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss 
SOURCE: UNO (2015b).
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 2015-2030 TABLE 3
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In terms of governance, there has been a re-balancing in favour of the emerging economies 
both in the Bretton Woods organisations (where they have gained more decision-making 
power) and, above all, by means of the creation of new regional institutions led by emerging 
economies, China in particular. IFIs have significantly increased their resources, albeit with 
an uneven geographical impact as a result of their regionalisation, with more resources in 
Asia and in Europe. The Addis Ababa conference has highlighted, moreover, the importance 
of integrating IFIs and private sector resources into a joint strategy for growth and 
development. 
In a parallel vein to the reforms in Europe, especially in the euro area, where the response 
to the crisis was “more Europe” (new institutions, more resources and new policies), the 
response at the international level is one of more international coordination, and more IFIs. 
With respect to the Bretton Woods map that emerged, with a small number of institutions 
devoted to clearly defined areas and a degree of specialisation, the new map evidences a 
greater proliferation of institutions and an overlapping of policies and scope, and greater 
institutional complexity, which poses fresh challenges in terms of coordinating initiatives 
and strategies. 
12.1.2016.
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BOX 1
 
THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANKS
The New Development Bank (NDB). Following the proposal by 
India at the IV BRICS Summit (2012), it was agreed at the VI 
Summit [2014, Fortaleza (Brazil)] to set up the NDB; it will 
foreseeably commence operating in 2016. The allocation of voting 
rights and the capital structure are equal across the five BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).
The NDB has an initial authorized capital of $100 billion. It is 
structured as a development bank for infrastructure (public and 
private alike) and sustainable development project financing in 
benefit of its members and other developing countries. Assistance 
will be implemented, inter alia, through loans, guarantees and 
participation in investments. Technical assistance tasks will also 
be undertaken, in cooperation with other international 
organisations.
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Promoted by the 
Chinese government in 2013, its Memorandum of Understanding 
was ratified in 2014 and its Articles of Agreement were signed by 
its 57 prospective founding members in June that year. It has 20 
non-regional members (14 from the EU), including Spain. It will be 
headquartered in Beijing, and China reserves itself a majority 
position (29.7% of voting power, 75% for the overall countries of 
the region).
The AIIB also has a starting capital of $100 billion. Its sphere of 
influence and its goal are to improve infrastructure under the 
principle of sustainable development. It may finance a member 
country or an institution operating in one of them or, exceptionally, 
a third country if it is in the interest of any of the members. In this 
connection, it will have instruments similar to those of the NDB.
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BOX 2
 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2000-2015)
The MDGs were set in 2000 and have marked the activity of the 
IFIs in promoting development over the past fifteen years. The 
goals took the specific form of 21 targets – the reference period for 
which was the 25-year term from 1990 to 2015 – grouped into 
eight major goals. The experience with the MDGs is mixed, with 
the specific fulfilment of goals having proven uneven, both in 
terms of specific targets and of groups of countries and 
geographical regions or sub-regions (see accompanying table).
North Sub-Saharan East South East South West
Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Reduce extreme poverty by half
Productive employment and decent work 
Reduce hunger by half
Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education
Universal primary schooling
Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women
Equality in primary school enrolment for 
girls
Promotion of women in paid agricultural 
work
Female representation in national 
parliaments
Goal 4.Reduce mortality of children under 5
Reduce by two-thirds the mortality ratio 
among the under-5s
Goal 5. Improve maternal health
Reduce by three-quarters the maternal 
mortality ratio
Access to reproductive health care
Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
Universal access to treatment for 
HIV/AIDS
Halt and reverse the spread of 
tuberculosis
Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability
Reduce the loss of environmental 
resources
Reduce biodiversity loss
Halve the proportion of the population 
without safe drinking water
Halve the proportion of the population 
without sanitation services
Improve the lives of slum dwellers
Goal 8. Global partnership for development
Develop an open, non-discriminatory 
trading system
Ensure the sustainability of long-term debt
Have access to the benefits of new 
technology
  TARGET ACHIEVED OR EXCELLENT PROGRESS   GOOD PROGRESS
SSERGORP ESROW RO ROOP  SSERGORP ELBATPECCA  
  DATA UNAVAILABLE OR INSUFFICIENT
Caucuses 
and Central 
Asia
Goals and targets
aisAacirfA
Oceania
Latin America 
and Caribbean
SOURCE: United Nations (2015c and 2015d).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 42 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JANUARY 2016 THE NEW MAP OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
BOX 2
 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2000-2015) (cont’d)
At the aggregate level, the following achievements may be highlighted: 
the reduction in extreme poverty for the regions as a whole (the 
proportion of people living with less than $1.25 per day in the 
developing countries fell by 70%); the reduction by half in the 
numbers of people with insufficient nutrition and with limited access 
to drinking water (in these two cases, with significant regional 
differences); sexual equality in primary education in most of the 
regions (albeit still falling far short in terms of secondary and tertiary 
education, employment and political representation); and the 
reduction by more than 53% in the rates of infant mortality, albeit 
below the forecast reduction target. Less progress has been achieved 
in other goals such as curbing deforestation, halting emissions of 
greenhouse gases, preventing overfishing of sea stocks, halving the 
percentage of the population without access to adequate health care, 
and improving access to reproductive health services.
The MDGs have allowed several lessons to be drawn with regard 
to the formulation of the new SDGs and the means of implementing, 
monitoring and reviewing such goals [Sachs (2012)]. Some are 
positive, such as the importance of pragmatically setting a few 
simple and voluntary goals, such as a set of moral commitments 
that are attainable with specific measures; and others are negative, 
to be corrected in the SDGs, such as the importance of improving 
the flow and availability of updated statistical information, the 
importance of involving the private sector, and the need to take 
long-term sustainability into account.
